Kohima, June 22 : The Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) has forcefully shut down all mobile networks in Zunheboto, which Sumi apex bodies have opposed.
The Sumi Hoho said the NSCN (K) had demanded money from mobile operators and forced them to shut down for failing to pay on time.
Sumi frontal organisations under the aegis of Sumi Hoho today convened an emergency meeting in Zunheboto town and condemned the unlawful act. Sumi Kukami Hoho, Sumi Totimi Hoho, Sumi Kiphimi Kuqhakulu and Zunheboto Town Youth Organisation attended the meeting.
Sunday, June 21, 2015
Sunday, June 14, 2015
Manipur police arrest ‘wrong’ Naga rebel leader
The crackdown on rebels in Manipur following the June 4 ambush on an army convoy has seen the state police arrest the leader of the “wrong” Naga rebel group. The alleged goof-up was the second in less than a week.
A statement issued by the Manipur Police last week said three rebels including two of National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) were arrested after the ambush in which 18 soldiers were killed. The third, 22-year-old Md Zahed Ali, belonged to Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) that assisted NSCN-K in the ambush.
The NSCN-K functionaries were identified as Khumloi Abi Anal alias Ambison, 40, chairman of the Amamcht region (Chandel district where the ambush happened) and Panmei Kalingong, 31.
Last Saturday, a communiqué from the NSCN-Reformation (NSCN-R) implied the police erred in arresting the wrong rebel from the wrong group. “Ambison is the chairman of the Amamcht region of NSCN-R and not a member of NSCN-K,” it said.
It added Ambison had merged his region with the NSCN-R group led by Wangtin Naga and P Tikhak who left NSCN-K after falling out with the Myanmar-based SS Khaplang earlier this year.
“The information related to the merger got delayed, which seem to have given undue advantage to the security forces,” it said.
On June 7, the National Investigation Agency and Manipur Police made a faux pax by registering a case against Kugnalu Mulatonu and Alezo Venuh Chakhesang for the June 4 ambush.
The two are senior leaders of the NSCN (Khole-Kitovi) that had broken away from NSCN-K a few years ago. The Khole-Kitovi group was recognised by the ministry of home affairs as a separate group under the ceasefire ambit.
A statement issued by the Manipur Police last week said three rebels including two of National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) were arrested after the ambush in which 18 soldiers were killed. The third, 22-year-old Md Zahed Ali, belonged to Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) that assisted NSCN-K in the ambush.
The NSCN-K functionaries were identified as Khumloi Abi Anal alias Ambison, 40, chairman of the Amamcht region (Chandel district where the ambush happened) and Panmei Kalingong, 31.
Last Saturday, a communiqué from the NSCN-Reformation (NSCN-R) implied the police erred in arresting the wrong rebel from the wrong group. “Ambison is the chairman of the Amamcht region of NSCN-R and not a member of NSCN-K,” it said.
It added Ambison had merged his region with the NSCN-R group led by Wangtin Naga and P Tikhak who left NSCN-K after falling out with the Myanmar-based SS Khaplang earlier this year.
“The information related to the merger got delayed, which seem to have given undue advantage to the security forces,” it said.
On June 7, the National Investigation Agency and Manipur Police made a faux pax by registering a case against Kugnalu Mulatonu and Alezo Venuh Chakhesang for the June 4 ambush.
The two are senior leaders of the NSCN (Khole-Kitovi) that had broken away from NSCN-K a few years ago. The Khole-Kitovi group was recognised by the ministry of home affairs as a separate group under the ceasefire ambit.
Khaplang’s deal with Myanmar changed Northeast rebel equation
Burmese Naga rebel chieftain SS Khaplang’s truce with Myanmar’s Thein Sein government in 2012 is believed to have reinvigorated northeast militant outfits that began losing steam after the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) declared truce in July 1997.
The Myanmar government reportedly arranged Khaplang’s transport from his base in northern Sagaing division to a Yangon hospital recently for treatment. This underscores the 2012 deal ensuring the safety of Khaplang’s bases from attacks by the Tatmadaw (Burmese army) that reportedly, unlike Bhutan and Bangladesh, is not interested in chasing India rebels out.
The safety of these bases made other northeast outfits such as the Paresh Baruah faction of United Liberation Front of Asom (Ulfa-Independent) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Songbijit turn to the NSCN-K.
For Khaplang, intelligence officials say, sheltering other groups serves a dual purpose. It generates revenue since the others pay to use his facilities and weapons, and gives him extra fighting hands against enemies, besides making him a ‘natural leader’ of an anti-Indian coalition.
For the other outfits, Khaplang’s are the safest trans-border bases with Bhutan and Bangladesh turning ‘hostile’ due to improved diplomatic relations with New Delhi.
“What made Khaplang turn against India after 14 years of truce was the allegation that New Delhi was isolating the Nagas on the Indian side,” Pradip Phanjoubam, editor of Imphal Free Press and an observer of northeast militancy, said.
There are close to 50 Naga tribes spread across India and Myanmar. The division within the NSCN-K on ‘Indian’ and ‘Burmese’ lines became apparent when two leaders formed the Khole-Kitovi factions a few years ago.
“The MHA (Ministry of Home Affairs) officials probably wanted to wash their hands off Khaplang, leaving him to settle his scores with the Myanmar government,” Phanjoubam said.
The Myanmar government reportedly arranged Khaplang’s transport from his base in northern Sagaing division to a Yangon hospital recently for treatment. This underscores the 2012 deal ensuring the safety of Khaplang’s bases from attacks by the Tatmadaw (Burmese army) that reportedly, unlike Bhutan and Bangladesh, is not interested in chasing India rebels out.
The safety of these bases made other northeast outfits such as the Paresh Baruah faction of United Liberation Front of Asom (Ulfa-Independent) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Songbijit turn to the NSCN-K.
For Khaplang, intelligence officials say, sheltering other groups serves a dual purpose. It generates revenue since the others pay to use his facilities and weapons, and gives him extra fighting hands against enemies, besides making him a ‘natural leader’ of an anti-Indian coalition.
For the other outfits, Khaplang’s are the safest trans-border bases with Bhutan and Bangladesh turning ‘hostile’ due to improved diplomatic relations with New Delhi.
“What made Khaplang turn against India after 14 years of truce was the allegation that New Delhi was isolating the Nagas on the Indian side,” Pradip Phanjoubam, editor of Imphal Free Press and an observer of northeast militancy, said.
There are close to 50 Naga tribes spread across India and Myanmar. The division within the NSCN-K on ‘Indian’ and ‘Burmese’ lines became apparent when two leaders formed the Khole-Kitovi factions a few years ago.
“The MHA (Ministry of Home Affairs) officials probably wanted to wash their hands off Khaplang, leaving him to settle his scores with the Myanmar government,” Phanjoubam said.
Thursday, June 11, 2015
The enemy is not the insurgent
Discreteness has its own advantages
Once
the euphoria over `Operation Myanmar’ subsides, hard questions will
still remain to be answered: has India turned the clock back on its
longest running insurgency after army commandoes hot-pursued Naga
underground fighters belonging to the Khaplang faction of the National
Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K)? Can a raid of this quantum be
replicated when militants transgress the Line of Control to attack
civilians and army personnel in Jammu & Kashmir?
These are difficult and complex questions and need a sober and studied response. But regrettably the hotheads are already running away with the rhetorical ball. Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore, Minister of State in the Modi Government, for example, answers both the questions in the affirmative.
The army strike against the NSCN (Khaplang) and other militant organisations that had lost their lease in Bangladesh after Dhaka accepted New Delhi's overtures, did demonstrate India's maturing capacity to conduct counter-insurgency operations. But the Myanmar operation was not exactly out-of-ordinary. Such operations have taken place for the past 20 years along the border with Myanmar and similar choices have been made by all previous governments. Four types of insurgency plague South Asia - ethnic discrimination, institutional legacy of colonisation, redistribution of resources and superpower initiated wars. India has its share of all four.
Over the years democratic India has finessed ways and means of dealing with insurgencies. Once a measure of domination has been established, India has employed a three-stage process. First, dialogue and, second, suspension of ``operations' by both sides. The third phase - maintenance of the ceasefire agreement -- has been problematic. Any disgruntled faction can disrupt the peace process.
Armed wings of militant groups such as those headed by Paresh Barua in case of ULFA and I S Songbijit of the NDFB have been disruptive because peace means loss of income with the withering away of the conflict economy of extortion, siphoning off development funds and trade in contraband. These economic realities hamper the third stage of enforcing the ceasefire agreement, especially in the North-East. It was New Delhi's compulsion to strike hard at the NSCN (Khaplang) as it was acting as a spoiler in the stabilising of the second-stage peace process with the dominant faction of the Nagas headed by Isac Swu and T Muivah (NSCN - IM).
After walking out of the peace process earlier this year, Khaplang had started rallying around smaller Naga tribes and armed factions elsewhere in the North-East which had reasons to disassociate from conflict resolution. In recent months, the Khaplang faction was testing New Delhi's patience. The killing of Dogra Regiment soldiers this month had many commonalities with two previous attacks. All three took place in three different states - Tirap in Arunachal Pradesh in April, Mon in Nagaland in May and, finally the last straw, the Tamenglong ambush in Manipur -- with a dry run two months earlier. Tellingly, each location was within a fleeing distance from Myanmar. These were aimed at appropriating the legacy of the NSCN (IM) which had gone back on the struggle for Nagalim (Greater Nagaland) beyond the borders of the present Nagaland.
Our security forces had all the advantages. Apart from the modern accoutrements such as UAVs and latest hand-held weapons, they also had available to them certain amount of political capital garnered during New Delhi's two decades long outreach to the NSCN (IM).
This outreach, patient and painstaking, yielded handsome dividends. The demand for independence was dropped as was their insistence for Nagalim by merging Naga majority areas of Manipur, Arunachal and Mizoram into Nagaland. How toxic this demand could get was evident over a decade ago when non-Nagas gutted the Manipur Assembly after the then Home Minister, L K Advani, proposed an extension of the ceasefire in Nagaland to the Naga-dominated areas of other states.
The concessions negotiated with the NSCN (IM) appeared to be leading to a Mizoram type solution under which Chief Minister P Lalthanhawla vacated his chair for insurgent leader Pu Laldenga after the Mizoram Peace Accord in 1986. The possibility of NSCN (IM) leader Isak Chu replacing the current Nagaland Chief Minister generated an apprehension among the smaller Naga clans leading to Khaplang's annulment of the ceasefire with the army.
On a tactical level, the ambush of Dogra Regiment was ill-chosen. Kuki militias have dominated the area till Khaplang aligned with another militant group to displace them. With loyalties fractured by ethnic divisions, there was a superior flow of intelligence enabling the operation. Also, the NSCN (IM), the larger Naga group, was unwilling to stand by Khaplang as it feared he might occupy the radical space.
But Naga insurgency has seen this phenomenon earlier. Angami Phizo, the political mentor of all three Naga militant leaders — Isak Swu, T. Muivah and Khaplang — had taken control of the Naga movement after eliminating the moderates inclined for a political settlement with India. History was repeated after the Shillong Accord of 1975, when moderates were clubbed to death in market places leading to the emergence of the NSCN (IM). To avoid the re-emergence of a more vicious hydra, the Centre must work to change the political economy of conflict in the North-East. The states must be enlisted as whole-hearted partners who discourage its youth from dabbling in the shadow business of extortions, kidnappings, siphoning off funds and smuggling.
This is admittedly more difficult and a long haul. Rathore's patchwork solution of the Indian Army sallying forth on cross-border commando raids in Myanmar and Pakistan has understandably set the cat among the pigeons. While Myanmar's protestations have been mild due to India's handholding during the years of its isolation from the West, Pakistan had no reasons to be restrained. With the most well trained army to the west of India, Pakistan's ministers have already warned New Delhi against drawing parallels. Ministers in the Modi Government seem incapable of learning that discretion has its own use.
Despite the attempts at machismo after the successful raid, India's political leadership must exert just enough coercion to force rebels into becoming active participants in greater stability and above-board economic life. The Myanmar raid was not the first cross-border operation. The earlier ones in Bhutan and Myanmar helped accomplish larger political goals; the grievance about redistribution of resources or representation in institutions of political power was credibly addressed. Many areas have resisted a full integration with India since 1947.
The challenge is to convince people about the advantages of integrating with India’s democratic political processes, though through less coercion and more accommodation. Our enemy is not the insurgent but insurgency.
These are difficult and complex questions and need a sober and studied response. But regrettably the hotheads are already running away with the rhetorical ball. Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore, Minister of State in the Modi Government, for example, answers both the questions in the affirmative.
The army strike against the NSCN (Khaplang) and other militant organisations that had lost their lease in Bangladesh after Dhaka accepted New Delhi's overtures, did demonstrate India's maturing capacity to conduct counter-insurgency operations. But the Myanmar operation was not exactly out-of-ordinary. Such operations have taken place for the past 20 years along the border with Myanmar and similar choices have been made by all previous governments. Four types of insurgency plague South Asia - ethnic discrimination, institutional legacy of colonisation, redistribution of resources and superpower initiated wars. India has its share of all four.
Over the years democratic India has finessed ways and means of dealing with insurgencies. Once a measure of domination has been established, India has employed a three-stage process. First, dialogue and, second, suspension of ``operations' by both sides. The third phase - maintenance of the ceasefire agreement -- has been problematic. Any disgruntled faction can disrupt the peace process.
Armed wings of militant groups such as those headed by Paresh Barua in case of ULFA and I S Songbijit of the NDFB have been disruptive because peace means loss of income with the withering away of the conflict economy of extortion, siphoning off development funds and trade in contraband. These economic realities hamper the third stage of enforcing the ceasefire agreement, especially in the North-East. It was New Delhi's compulsion to strike hard at the NSCN (Khaplang) as it was acting as a spoiler in the stabilising of the second-stage peace process with the dominant faction of the Nagas headed by Isac Swu and T Muivah (NSCN - IM).
After walking out of the peace process earlier this year, Khaplang had started rallying around smaller Naga tribes and armed factions elsewhere in the North-East which had reasons to disassociate from conflict resolution. In recent months, the Khaplang faction was testing New Delhi's patience. The killing of Dogra Regiment soldiers this month had many commonalities with two previous attacks. All three took place in three different states - Tirap in Arunachal Pradesh in April, Mon in Nagaland in May and, finally the last straw, the Tamenglong ambush in Manipur -- with a dry run two months earlier. Tellingly, each location was within a fleeing distance from Myanmar. These were aimed at appropriating the legacy of the NSCN (IM) which had gone back on the struggle for Nagalim (Greater Nagaland) beyond the borders of the present Nagaland.
Our security forces had all the advantages. Apart from the modern accoutrements such as UAVs and latest hand-held weapons, they also had available to them certain amount of political capital garnered during New Delhi's two decades long outreach to the NSCN (IM).
This outreach, patient and painstaking, yielded handsome dividends. The demand for independence was dropped as was their insistence for Nagalim by merging Naga majority areas of Manipur, Arunachal and Mizoram into Nagaland. How toxic this demand could get was evident over a decade ago when non-Nagas gutted the Manipur Assembly after the then Home Minister, L K Advani, proposed an extension of the ceasefire in Nagaland to the Naga-dominated areas of other states.
The concessions negotiated with the NSCN (IM) appeared to be leading to a Mizoram type solution under which Chief Minister P Lalthanhawla vacated his chair for insurgent leader Pu Laldenga after the Mizoram Peace Accord in 1986. The possibility of NSCN (IM) leader Isak Chu replacing the current Nagaland Chief Minister generated an apprehension among the smaller Naga clans leading to Khaplang's annulment of the ceasefire with the army.
On a tactical level, the ambush of Dogra Regiment was ill-chosen. Kuki militias have dominated the area till Khaplang aligned with another militant group to displace them. With loyalties fractured by ethnic divisions, there was a superior flow of intelligence enabling the operation. Also, the NSCN (IM), the larger Naga group, was unwilling to stand by Khaplang as it feared he might occupy the radical space.
But Naga insurgency has seen this phenomenon earlier. Angami Phizo, the political mentor of all three Naga militant leaders — Isak Swu, T. Muivah and Khaplang — had taken control of the Naga movement after eliminating the moderates inclined for a political settlement with India. History was repeated after the Shillong Accord of 1975, when moderates were clubbed to death in market places leading to the emergence of the NSCN (IM). To avoid the re-emergence of a more vicious hydra, the Centre must work to change the political economy of conflict in the North-East. The states must be enlisted as whole-hearted partners who discourage its youth from dabbling in the shadow business of extortions, kidnappings, siphoning off funds and smuggling.
This is admittedly more difficult and a long haul. Rathore's patchwork solution of the Indian Army sallying forth on cross-border commando raids in Myanmar and Pakistan has understandably set the cat among the pigeons. While Myanmar's protestations have been mild due to India's handholding during the years of its isolation from the West, Pakistan had no reasons to be restrained. With the most well trained army to the west of India, Pakistan's ministers have already warned New Delhi against drawing parallels. Ministers in the Modi Government seem incapable of learning that discretion has its own use.
Despite the attempts at machismo after the successful raid, India's political leadership must exert just enough coercion to force rebels into becoming active participants in greater stability and above-board economic life. The Myanmar raid was not the first cross-border operation. The earlier ones in Bhutan and Myanmar helped accomplish larger political goals; the grievance about redistribution of resources or representation in institutions of political power was credibly addressed. Many areas have resisted a full integration with India since 1947.
The challenge is to convince people about the advantages of integrating with India’s democratic political processes, though through less coercion and more accommodation. Our enemy is not the insurgent but insurgency.
Tuesday, June 9, 2015
Khaplang emerges as most important militant leader in NE
SS
Khaplang has opposed the Shillong Accord signed by the then Naga
National Council (NNC) with the Government of India. (Photo Courtesy:
Sanjhamorcha Blog)The Hemi Naga tribesman from Myanmar has edged past the chairman of the region's biggest outfit —RK Meghen of United National Liberation Front (UNLF) of Manipur —who is now in Guwahati jail. Meghen wanted to become the chairman of the newly floated United Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFW).
Intelligence agencies intercepted messages sent by Meghen from Guwahati jail, directing his group not to join the UNLFW if the chairman's post is not given to him.
"Khaplang did not agree to this and he went ahead with the formation of the UNLFW on April 17 with just three other member outfits — Ulfa(I), NDFB (S) and KLO — besides NSCN(K)," a source said.
According to the initial plan, the UNLFW was supposed to be the common platform of all NE militant outfits, including the CorCom, another umbrella group of six Meitei outfits. The CorCom comprises of Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA), United National Liberation Front (UNLF), People's Revolutionary Party Kangleipak (PREPAK), People's Revolutionary Party Kangleipak (Pro), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) and Kanglei Yawol Kanba Lup (KYKL) — all Meitei outfits.
The UNLFW, while claiming responsibility of the ambushes on Assam Rifles on May 3 in Nagaland in which eight personnel were killed and the Army's 6 Dogra regiment on June 4 in Manipur in which 18 soldiers were killed, said the attacks were carried out under direct orders from Khaplang.
"The CorCom hasn't joined the UNLFW but Khaplang managed to get on board the two CorCom groups — KYKL and KCP — for the ambush in Manipur's Chandel district. This is double success for Khaplang — one for the attack on the Army and the second for getting support from Meitei outfits," the source said. He added, "Even if the Meitei groups, except UNLF, do not formally join UNLFW, we cannot say they will not offer their support in future."
Two Naga militants killed in accidental blast
Itanagar, Jun 10 : Two suspected cadres of Naga militant outfit NSCN-K were killed when an explosive device blew up accidentally at a remote place along the Myanmar border in Arunachal Pradesh on Tuesday, police said.
A third person was injured in the blast which took place at Wakka, just seven kilometers from the border in the newly-created Longding district.
"A group of militants were carrying some improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to be planted against the security forces. One of the IEDs exploded accidentally, killing two cadres instantly," a police official said.
"Their target was perhaps an Assam Rifles post nearby," he said.
The bodies of the two, a live IED and a remote control were found at the spot.
The slain militants were yet to be identified, the official said, adding that villagers told police that the militants forced them at gun-point to carry away the injured insurgent.
On Sunday, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) attacked a camp of the Assam Rifles at Lazu in Tirap district. There was no casualty as the paramilitary forces retaliated the attack.
The NSCN-K on June 4 attacked a convoy of the Indian Army in Chandel district of Manipur, killing 18 soldiers and injuring 11 others.
A third person was injured in the blast which took place at Wakka, just seven kilometers from the border in the newly-created Longding district.
"A group of militants were carrying some improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to be planted against the security forces. One of the IEDs exploded accidentally, killing two cadres instantly," a police official said.
"Their target was perhaps an Assam Rifles post nearby," he said.
The bodies of the two, a live IED and a remote control were found at the spot.
The slain militants were yet to be identified, the official said, adding that villagers told police that the militants forced them at gun-point to carry away the injured insurgent.
On Sunday, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) attacked a camp of the Assam Rifles at Lazu in Tirap district. There was no casualty as the paramilitary forces retaliated the attack.
The NSCN-K on June 4 attacked a convoy of the Indian Army in Chandel district of Manipur, killing 18 soldiers and injuring 11 others.
Monday, June 8, 2015
Indian Army recovers second body of militant killed in Manipur ambush
Imphal: A police team of Indian Army said on Monday that they have recovered another body of a militant, who was injured when militants ambushed a convoy of 6 Dogra Regiment on June 4, killing 18 soldiers and injuring 15 others.
Security officials said that the bullet-riddled body was recovered in the jungles of Leibung village, close to Myanmar border, near the ambush site yesterday. Identification of the body will be performed at Imphal.
It is suspected that KYKL (Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup) cadre was left behind in the village after he succumbed to the injuries while being taken back by the insurgents.
The Army had earlier recovered the body of NSCN-K cadre on June 4.
As per communication intercepts, it was a group of about 25-28 insurgents who had carried out the deadly ambush.
It is believed that the group has now divided itself into sub-groups of 4-5 men and are trying to make their way into Myanmar.
It is feared that 2-3 groups could have successfully moved out even though security forces have launched an extensive combing operation.
"There are two routes which can be used to get out of that area. Combing operation has started from both sides of the route and we hope to get some of the attackers," the sources told PTI.
The Army believes that majority of the attackers came from KYKL and rest from Khaplang group of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K) and the KCP (Kangleipak Communist Party).
The Army is keen to carry out "joint operations" with Myanmar to take out "camps" across the border, the sources said even as they ruled out any "hot pursuit".
Hot pursuit is a term used when security forces cross borders in search of suspects who have crossed over.
Security sources have admitted that there was an intelligence failure and that a "sense of complacency" could have crept in as no attacks had happened in that area for long.
According to initial reports, there were four vehicles moving in the Moltung area of Chandel district when the ambush took place.
The insurgents had used "lathod guns" (used for firing grenades) along with automatic rifles. The first truck carrying about 5-6 soldiers also had barrels of fuel which exploded taking out the trucks behind it.
The second truck was carrying about 18-19 soldiers while the rest of the about 46 member-strong convoy were in the other trucks.
The bodies of majority of the soldiers were charred completely.
Thursday, June 4, 2015
Manipur ambush: Chandel has been a breeding ground for insurgent groups
Located close to the Indo-Myanmar border, the district has witnessed numerous turf wars between the Indian Army and militants.
Written by Esha Roy
Imphal, Jun 5 : The New Samtal area in Manipur’s Chandel district, where a militant attack on Thursday killed 18 personnel of 6 Dogra Regiment, has for decades been the epicentre of operation of various insurgent groups in the state.
Imphal, Jun 5 : The New Samtal area in Manipur’s Chandel district, where a militant attack on Thursday killed 18 personnel of 6 Dogra Regiment, has for decades been the epicentre of operation of various insurgent groups in the state.
Located close to the Indo-Myanmar border, the district has witnessed
numerous turf wars between the Indian Army and militants and among the
insurgent groups themselves.
A hilly area, Chandel district peters off into the border town of Moreh before descending into the hot and humid plains of Myanmar.
In 1992, Naga insurgent group NSCN(IM)’s attempt to dominate Moreh was rebuffed by the dominant Kukis of the area. In violent clashes between the Nagas and the Kukis, 1,000 Kukis were killed, 360 Kuki villages were razed to the ground and around 100,000 were rendered homeless. These clashes led to emergence of Kuki insurgent groups in the state.
A scene after a military convoy was attacked by an unidentified
insurgent outfit first with a powerful Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
killing at least 20 army personnel and injuring 11 others in Manipur’s
Chandel district on Thursday. (Source: PTI Photo)
Currently, there are 20 Kuki groups in Manipur, but all of them are
under Suspension of Operation Agreements with the government. Apart from
Kuki groups, most insurgent groups (the Meitei underground groups) were
based in Chandel before being expunged by the Army.
The only groups to have not entered any agreement with the government, neither a ceasefire like the Naga groups, nor suspension of operation like the Kuki Groups, are valley groups such as United National Liberation Front, People’s Liberation Army, Kangleipak Liberation Party, KYKL and Prepak which continue to operate from across the Myanmar border.
The NSCN (K), led by S S Khaplang, a Burmese Naga, has over the decades provided shelter and arms to these groups. Incidentally, NSCN (K) withdrew from its ceasefire agreement with the government earlier this year.
The district is also known to be a hub of cross border smuggling of arms and drugs.
New Samtal, on its part, has a violent history and had been under the sway of UNLF for decades till as recently as 2008 when they were forced to flee to Myanmar after persistent army operations in the area.
Last month, Kuki National Liberation Front had alleged high handedness by the Dogra Regiment when they were forced to relocate their camp from Semon village in New Samtal.The villagers had fled their homes after having they were reportedly harassed by the surrendered group and had taken refuge with the 6th Dogra Regiment.
A hilly area, Chandel district peters off into the border town of Moreh before descending into the hot and humid plains of Myanmar.
In 1992, Naga insurgent group NSCN(IM)’s attempt to dominate Moreh was rebuffed by the dominant Kukis of the area. In violent clashes between the Nagas and the Kukis, 1,000 Kukis were killed, 360 Kuki villages were razed to the ground and around 100,000 were rendered homeless. These clashes led to emergence of Kuki insurgent groups in the state.
A scene after a military convoy was attacked by an unidentified
insurgent outfit first with a powerful Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
killing at least 20 army personnel and injuring 11 others in Manipur’s
Chandel district on Thursday. (Source: PTI Photo)
Currently, there are 20 Kuki groups in Manipur, but all of them are
under Suspension of Operation Agreements with the government. Apart from
Kuki groups, most insurgent groups (the Meitei underground groups) were
based in Chandel before being expunged by the Army.The only groups to have not entered any agreement with the government, neither a ceasefire like the Naga groups, nor suspension of operation like the Kuki Groups, are valley groups such as United National Liberation Front, People’s Liberation Army, Kangleipak Liberation Party, KYKL and Prepak which continue to operate from across the Myanmar border.
The NSCN (K), led by S S Khaplang, a Burmese Naga, has over the decades provided shelter and arms to these groups. Incidentally, NSCN (K) withdrew from its ceasefire agreement with the government earlier this year.
The district is also known to be a hub of cross border smuggling of arms and drugs.
New Samtal, on its part, has a violent history and had been under the sway of UNLF for decades till as recently as 2008 when they were forced to flee to Myanmar after persistent army operations in the area.
Last month, Kuki National Liberation Front had alleged high handedness by the Dogra Regiment when they were forced to relocate their camp from Semon village in New Samtal.The villagers had fled their homes after having they were reportedly harassed by the surrendered group and had taken refuge with the 6th Dogra Regiment.
All-Out Offensive Launched in Manipur to Eliminate Militants After 20 Army Personnel Killed in Ambush
File photo of Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh
New Delhi:
An all-out offensive was launched to trace and
eliminate the militants involved in massacre of 20 army men in Manipur
today.
The Indo-Myanmar border in Manipur has been closed to stop the militants fleeing to the neighbouring country.
At a high-level meeting, chaired by Home Minister Rajnath Singh and attended by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, Army Chief Dalbir Singh Suhag, Nation Security Advisor Ajit Doval besides others, took stock of the situation arising out of the ambush on the army personnel in the northeastern state.
The Home Minister ordered that no militant involved in the attack should be allowed to go scot free and strongest possible action should be taken against all those involved in the ambush, official sources said.
The central government took the incident very seriously and directed that all installations of the security forces in Manipur and Nagaland be put on high alert to foil any attempt by the militants to strike again.
The sources said the top security brass of the country was anguished over the killing of such a large number of armymen and decided that well-coordinated operations and strongest possible action are the only way out check the militant groups which continue to attack security forces and involve in subversive activities.
Using landmines, rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons, the insurgents ambushed the military convoy in Chandel district in the worst such attack in nearly two decades.
Eleven armymen were also injured in the ambush in which army and civilian authorities suspect the involvement of Manipur rebel outfit Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), a Meitei rebel organisation.
The Indo-Myanmar border in Manipur has been closed to stop the militants fleeing to the neighbouring country.
At a high-level meeting, chaired by Home Minister Rajnath Singh and attended by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, Army Chief Dalbir Singh Suhag, Nation Security Advisor Ajit Doval besides others, took stock of the situation arising out of the ambush on the army personnel in the northeastern state.
The Home Minister ordered that no militant involved in the attack should be allowed to go scot free and strongest possible action should be taken against all those involved in the ambush, official sources said.
The central government took the incident very seriously and directed that all installations of the security forces in Manipur and Nagaland be put on high alert to foil any attempt by the militants to strike again.
The sources said the top security brass of the country was anguished over the killing of such a large number of armymen and decided that well-coordinated operations and strongest possible action are the only way out check the militant groups which continue to attack security forces and involve in subversive activities.
Using landmines, rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons, the insurgents ambushed the military convoy in Chandel district in the worst such attack in nearly two decades.
Eleven armymen were also injured in the ambush in which army and civilian authorities suspect the involvement of Manipur rebel outfit Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), a Meitei rebel organisation.
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