Night curfew clamped along Myanmar border in Manipur

IMPHAL, Oct 19 - Night curfew has been imposed along the 380-km Indo-Myanmar border in Ukhrul, Chandel and Churachandpur districts in Manipur for six months following a request made by Indian Army and Assam Rifles authorities.

The magistrates of the three districts issued separate orders in their respective districts prohibiting movement of any person within three km belt from the international border, government officials said. The curfew would be in force from 5 pm to 5 am, the officials said.

Army and Assam Rifles deployed along the international border in Manipur are maintaing strict vigil to check night movement, they said.

Myanmar Government had signed the ceasefire accord with eight out of 15 ethnic armed groups involved in the peace deal on Thursday, signalling an end to nearly six decades of civil conflict in that country. The impact of the ceasefire in Myanmar might have effect on the porous Indian border, the sources said. –

HPC(D) militant arrested

AIZAWL, Oct 19 - Self-styled commander of Manipur-based Hmar People’s Convention (Democrats) ‘Sergeant’ Biakliana was arrested by Assam Rifles personnel at Jograpur in Manipur last evening, Mizoram police said today.

Biakliana was the commander of the HPC(D) militants who ambushed the Mizoram Assembly Committee on Government Assurances team near Mizoram-Manipur border in Zokhawthiang hamlet on March 28 last, killing three policemen on the spot, police said.

“He was also wanted by Mizoram Police in a number of criminal cases registered against him in police stations adjoining Manipur,” the official said. He would be brought to Mizoram to face charges levelled against him.

Khaplang to skip Naga ceasefire talks in Myanmar

SS Khaplang (right), leader of Naga insurgent group NSCN (Khaplang).

NEW DELHI: As representatives of Naga Hoho, the apex body of Naga tribes, head to Myanmar to persuade NSCN (Khaplang) to resume the ceasefire it had abrogated in March, NSCN(K) chairman SS Khaplang has reportedly excused himself from meeting them, citing health reasons. He has instead deputed the outfit's vice-chairman Khango Konyak and top military commander Nikki Sumi to talk to the Naga representatives.

Incidentally, self-styled Lt Gen Nikki Sumi was the mastermind behind the June 4 ambush in Chandel, Manipur, which killed 18 Army personnel.

The Naga Hoho delegation, which will also comprise representatives of the Eastern Naga People's Organization (ENPO), is expected to carry the Nagaland government and state legislature's message to NSCN(K) to rethink its decision to abrogate the ceasefire with the government of India, and become part of a final Naga peace settlement.

Earlier this month, the rival NSCN(I-M) faction had entered into a peace accord with the government, which reportedly laid down the 'framework' within which the terms of a final Naga settlement are to be worked out.

Incidentally, the home ministry is not too hopeful about the outcome of the Naga Hoho's efforts to persuade NSCN (Khaplang) to revive its truce in Nagaland.

"Khaplang being a Myanmarese Naga may not see much benefit in a peace settlement limited to the Indian side. Even if Nikki Sumi and Khango Konyak, both of whom are Indian nationals, show an interest in resuming the ceasefire, they may not like to rebel against Khaplang. Besides, even if they were to consider crossing over, the NIA case against Sumi relating to the June 4 ambush is too serious to offer him amnesty or even bail," an officer pointed out.

Meanwhile, home ministry officials have written to the ministry of defence conveying that there will be no change in enforcement of the ceasefire ground rules in Nagaland. This follows a clarification to this effect from the Centre's interlocutor for Naga talks, RN Ravi.

NSCN-K shuts cell networks

Kohima, June 22 : The Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) has forcefully shut down all mobile networks in Zunheboto, which Sumi apex bodies have opposed.

The Sumi Hoho said the NSCN (K) had demanded money from mobile operators and forced them to shut down for failing to pay on time.

Sumi frontal organisations under the aegis of Sumi Hoho today convened an emergency meeting in Zunheboto town and condemned the unlawful act. Sumi Kukami Hoho, Sumi Totimi Hoho, Sumi Kiphimi Kuqhakulu and Zunheboto Town Youth Organisation attended the meeting.

Manipur police arrest ‘wrong’ Naga rebel leader

The crackdown on rebels in Manipur following the June 4 ambush on an army convoy has seen the state police arrest the leader of the “wrong” Naga rebel group. The alleged goof-up was the second in less than a week.

A statement issued by the Manipur Police last week said three rebels including two of National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) were arrested after the ambush in which 18 soldiers were killed. The third, 22-year-old Md Zahed Ali, belonged to Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) that assisted NSCN-K in the ambush.

The NSCN-K functionaries were identified as Khumloi Abi Anal alias Ambison, 40, chairman of the Amamcht region (Chandel district where the ambush happened) and Panmei Kalingong, 31.

Last Saturday, a communiqué from the NSCN-Reformation (NSCN-R) implied the police erred in arresting the wrong rebel from the wrong group. “Ambison is the chairman of the Amamcht region of NSCN-R and not a member of NSCN-K,” it said.

It added Ambison had merged his region with the NSCN-R group led by Wangtin Naga and P Tikhak who left NSCN-K after falling out with the Myanmar-based SS Khaplang earlier this year.

“The information related to the merger got delayed, which seem to have given undue advantage to the security forces,” it said.

On June 7, the National Investigation Agency and Manipur Police made a faux pax by registering a case against Kugnalu Mulatonu and Alezo Venuh Chakhesang for the June 4 ambush.

The two are senior leaders of the NSCN (Khole-Kitovi) that had broken away from NSCN-K a few years ago. The Khole-Kitovi group was recognised by the ministry of home affairs as a separate group under the ceasefire ambit.

Khaplang’s deal with Myanmar changed Northeast rebel equation

Burmese Naga rebel chieftain SS Khaplang’s truce with Myanmar’s Thein Sein government in 2012 is believed to have reinvigorated northeast militant outfits that began losing steam after the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) declared truce in July 1997.

The Myanmar government reportedly arranged Khaplang’s transport from his base in northern Sagaing division to a Yangon hospital recently for treatment. This underscores the 2012 deal ensuring the safety of Khaplang’s bases from attacks by the Tatmadaw (Burmese army) that reportedly, unlike Bhutan and Bangladesh, is not interested in chasing India rebels out.

The safety of these bases made other northeast outfits such as the Paresh Baruah faction of United Liberation Front of Asom (Ulfa-Independent) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Songbijit turn to the NSCN-K.

For Khaplang, intelligence officials say, sheltering other groups serves a dual purpose. It generates revenue since the others pay to use his facilities and weapons, and gives him extra fighting hands against enemies, besides making him a ‘natural leader’ of an anti-Indian coalition.

For the other outfits, Khaplang’s are the safest trans-border bases with Bhutan and Bangladesh turning ‘hostile’ due to improved diplomatic relations with New Delhi.

“What made Khaplang turn against India after 14 years of truce was the allegation that New Delhi was isolating the Nagas on the Indian side,” Pradip Phanjoubam, editor of Imphal Free Press and an observer of northeast militancy, said.

There are close to 50 Naga tribes spread across India and Myanmar. The division within the NSCN-K on ‘Indian’ and ‘Burmese’ lines became apparent when two leaders formed the Khole-Kitovi factions a few years ago.

“The MHA (Ministry of Home Affairs) officials probably wanted to wash their hands off Khaplang, leaving him to settle his scores with the Myanmar government,” Phanjoubam said.

The enemy is not the insurgent

Discreteness has its own advantages

Once the euphoria over `Operation Myanmar’ subsides, hard questions will still remain to be answered: has India turned the clock back on its longest running insurgency after army commandoes hot-pursued Naga underground fighters belonging to the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K)? Can a raid of this quantum be replicated when militants transgress the Line of Control to attack civilians and army personnel in Jammu & Kashmir? 

These are difficult and complex questions and need a sober and studied response. But regrettably the hotheads are already running away with the rhetorical ball. Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore, Minister of State in the Modi Government, for example, answers both the questions in the affirmative. 

The army strike against the NSCN (Khaplang) and other militant organisations that had lost their lease in Bangladesh after Dhaka accepted New Delhi's overtures, did demonstrate India's maturing capacity to conduct counter-insurgency operations. But the Myanmar operation was not exactly out-of-ordinary. Such operations have taken place for the past 20 years along the border with Myanmar and similar choices have been made by all previous governments. Four types of insurgency plague South Asia - ethnic discrimination, institutional legacy of colonisation, redistribution of resources and superpower initiated wars. India has its share of all four.  

Over the years democratic India has finessed ways and means of dealing with insurgencies. Once a measure of domination has been established, India has employed a three-stage process. First, dialogue and, second, suspension of ``operations' by both sides. The third phase - maintenance of the ceasefire agreement -- has been problematic. Any disgruntled faction can disrupt the peace process. 

Armed wings of militant groups such as those headed by Paresh Barua in case of ULFA and I S Songbijit of the NDFB have been disruptive because peace means loss of income with the withering away of the conflict economy of extortion, siphoning off development funds and trade in contraband. These economic realities hamper the third stage of enforcing the ceasefire agreement, especially in the North-East. It was New Delhi's compulsion to strike hard at the NSCN (Khaplang) as it was acting as a spoiler in the stabilising of the second-stage peace process with the dominant faction of the Nagas headed by Isac Swu and T Muivah (NSCN - IM).

After walking out of the peace process earlier this year, Khaplang had started rallying around smaller Naga tribes and armed factions elsewhere in the North-East which had reasons to disassociate from conflict resolution. In recent months, the Khaplang faction was testing New Delhi's patience. The killing of Dogra Regiment soldiers this month had many commonalities with two previous attacks. All three took place in three different states - Tirap in Arunachal Pradesh in April, Mon in Nagaland in May and, finally the last straw, the Tamenglong ambush in Manipur -- with a dry run two months earlier. Tellingly, each location was within a fleeing distance from Myanmar. These were aimed at appropriating the legacy of the NSCN (IM) which had gone back on the struggle for Nagalim (Greater Nagaland) beyond the borders of the present Nagaland.

Our security forces had all the advantages. Apart from the modern accoutrements such as UAVs and latest hand-held weapons, they also had available to them certain amount of political capital garnered during New Delhi's two decades long outreach to the NSCN (IM).

This outreach, patient and painstaking, yielded handsome dividends. The demand for independence was dropped as was their insistence for Nagalim by merging Naga majority areas of Manipur, Arunachal and Mizoram into Nagaland. How toxic this demand could get was evident over a decade ago when non-Nagas gutted the Manipur Assembly after the then Home Minister, L K Advani, proposed an extension of the ceasefire in Nagaland to the Naga-dominated areas of other states. 

The concessions negotiated with the NSCN (IM) appeared to be leading to a Mizoram type solution under which Chief Minister P Lalthanhawla vacated his chair for insurgent leader Pu Laldenga after the Mizoram Peace Accord in 1986. The possibility of NSCN (IM) leader Isak Chu replacing the current Nagaland Chief Minister generated an apprehension among the smaller Naga clans leading to Khaplang's annulment of the ceasefire with the army.  

On a tactical level, the ambush of Dogra Regiment was ill-chosen. Kuki militias have dominated the area till Khaplang aligned with another militant group to displace them. With loyalties fractured by ethnic divisions, there was a superior flow of intelligence enabling the operation. Also, the NSCN (IM), the larger Naga group, was unwilling to stand by Khaplang as it feared he might occupy the radical space. 

But Naga insurgency has seen this phenomenon earlier. Angami Phizo, the political mentor of all three Naga militant leaders — Isak Swu, T. Muivah and Khaplang — had taken control of the Naga movement after eliminating the moderates inclined for a political settlement with India.  History was repeated after the Shillong Accord of 1975, when moderates were clubbed to death in market places leading to the emergence of the NSCN (IM). To avoid the re-emergence of a more vicious hydra, the Centre must work to change the political economy of conflict in the North-East. The states must be enlisted as whole-hearted partners who discourage its youth from dabbling in the shadow business of extortions, kidnappings, siphoning off funds and smuggling. 

This is admittedly more difficult and a long haul. Rathore's patchwork solution of the Indian Army sallying forth on cross-border commando raids in Myanmar and Pakistan has understandably set the cat among the pigeons. While Myanmar's protestations have been mild due to India's handholding during the years of its isolation from the West, Pakistan had no reasons to be restrained. With the most well trained army to the west of India, Pakistan's ministers have already warned New Delhi against drawing parallels. Ministers in the Modi Government seem incapable of learning that discretion has its own use.

Despite the attempts at machismo after the successful raid, India's political leadership must exert just enough coercion to force rebels into becoming active participants in greater stability and above-board economic life.  The Myanmar raid was not the first cross-border operation. The earlier ones in Bhutan and Myanmar helped accomplish larger political goals; the grievance about redistribution of resources or representation in institutions of political power was credibly addressed. Many areas have resisted a full integration with India since 1947.

The challenge is to convince people about the advantages of integrating with India’s democratic political processes,  though through less coercion and more accommodation. Our enemy is not the insurgent but insurgency.